I have
been hit like a ton of bricks by Daniel Ellsberg's new book, The
Doomsday Machine, Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.i
It reminds me of a book I read over ten years ago, Confessions of an
Economic Hit Man, by John Perkins.ii
Like Ellsberg, Perkins had been trained in a discipline, was
fascinated by it, and then used his abilities in the service of what
turned out to be Establishment evil. In Perkins' case, it was
selling loans to the governments of developing countries that he knew
would be a disaster, but he went along with it until he awakened and
wrote his exposé.
We all know what Ellsberg did with the Pentagon Papers, his rather
more famous turning against The Machine than is the current book.
But it turns out that this later revolt is the more startling and
compelling one. Like, ton of bricks compelling.
One
of the reasons for my “ton of bricks” reaction is what I learned
in graduate school in the field of public policy, first at the
Goldman School at Cal, and later at Yale. At both universities we
looked at public policy in a multidisciplinary way, which was key.
We used economics and cost/benefit analysis, strategic rationality
and decision making theory, political analysis, sociology, and –
most eye-opening of all – organizational theory and behavior.
(Given our current Trump-time, it seems we could have used personal
psychology as well, but they did pretty well with the disciplines
they had. Unfortunately, the Goldman School has abandoned
organizational theory in favor of more quantitative work, alas.)
The art of policy analysis is putting them all together to see why
what happened did happen, and to try to craft policies with an eye to
all these different points of view. Policy making is art – you
can't just say “this program would be good,” you have to look at
who would sponsor and support it, who would take it over, who would
distort it, how it would be implemented, and could it pass. There
was a debate as to whether or not a policy proposal should include
all these aspects. I thought it should include as many as possible,
especially politics and organizational analysis, and I wrote my book
on the federal program of providing health care for migrant workers
using economics, politics, and organizational theory.iii
I thought it worked well putting it all together, and in a real
world test, I used that book to get a whole new version of the
Migrant Health Law passed by Congress, and today the program is
working pretty much as I had envisioned it so far as I know.
Amazing, I know.
At
an exponentially more important level is The Essence of Decision, by
Graham Allison, which I read at Yale after I wrote my little migrant
health book. E of D looked at the Cuban Missile Crisis from the
standpoints of rational decision making, political theory of interest
groups within both American and Soviet governments, and
organizational theory.iv
This is a fabulous book that anyone serious about public policy
should read – I rarely say anything that sweeping, but there it is.
Here is an example of how organizations affected the Crisis: when
Kennedy tried to control how the Soviet ships headed to Cuba would be
blockaded (the term they used, “quarantined,” was intended to
seem less bellicose) the admiral in charge of the Navy told Kennedy
to back off. “Mr. President, the Navy will run the blockade,”
was pretty close to what he said. They had their standard operating
procedures, the modus
operandi, and
fine-tuning was not possible. Kennedy was concerned that if they
didn't do it right and avoided being too strong-armed, you know what
could happen. When you deal with organizations, you can try to get
it to make fine distinctions, but you will probably fail. See also,
for instance, the difficulty of having soldiers in Iraq or
Afghanistan, trained killers, becoming peacemaking nation builders
instead. It can sometimes work to some extent with prolonged effort,
but it's hard.
So,
the ton of bricks is this. Ellsberg looks not just at the theory of
nuclear war, to which he contributed as a decision theory analyst,
but what it meant in practice. He was present at the creation of MAD
– Mutually Assured Destruction – a standoff that still persists.
But, since he existed in the real world, and crucially, because his
loyalty to America was completely assured and he could gain
clearances way beyond Top Secret, since he was totally credentialed,
he could go out and see and verify beyond theory, beyond the games
and simulations and reliance on rationality that university guys like
Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter usually stop at.
He
was young, energetic, and very smart – think Tom Clancy's Jack
Ryan, think the young Alex Baldwin, think the Hunt for Red October,
but think the Pacific. The Chief of CINCPAC, Admiral Harry D. Felt,
wanted to know what was going on under his command, really know, not
just get reports. One of the things we learned in public policy
school, I think it was from our favorite book, Inside Bureaucracy by
Anthony Downsv
– I think that was where it was, but maybe not – was about
information, conformation to orders, and chain of command. Think
about a chief giving an order to his or her subordinate. How much of
that order is understood and accepted? Never 100%. Maybe 80% would
be an average? Then the subordinate orders his or her own
subordinate. As you go down the chain, you expect less
understanding, more shading, so at the second level it's maybe 70%.
By the time you get to the fourth level down, what's going on? 80%
times 70% times 70 % equals about 40%. This means that if an order
requires just three levels down, less than half of the order is
understood and enacted.
It's
a general issue, not just military. Remember the Hubble telescope
disaster? They spent $1.5 billion to put a great telescope up in
space and it wouldn't focus. Why? Despite the most quality control
surveillance possible, the very best people working to maximum
capacity at the respected Perkin-Elmer company, way down the
production chain of command, the skilled workers found that there was
a small flaw, and instead of reporting it up the chain of command,
they fixed it on the spot the way they were used to fixing things, by
putting in a small shim. It worked at their level, but when it
integrated at the necessary higher level, it didn't. People do
things the way they are used to doing things, and it is impossible to
coordinate complexity in large organizations with 100% fidelity. It
just can't be done.
So
the savvy Admiral Felt was being very competent when he sent the
young RAND analyst Ellsberg out to the field, to forward bases in
Okinawa, in Korea, and in Japan where nuclear weapons were – and
are - attached to planes close to China and ever-ready to achieve
airborne alert status. He was right to be suspicious that
on-the-spot commanders, especially those trained in the American way,
to be able to improvise, to take responsibility on themselves, that
diffusion of responsibility that had worked so well when it was local
commanders who invented a way over the hedgerows in the Normandy
invasion – he was right to think that his information in command
headquarters in Hawaii would be incomplete.
And
incomplete it was. Ellsberg found, for one thing, that they
rehearsed their roles constantly, and no matter the time of day or
night, planes were ready for takeoff with their nuclear loads within
ten minutes. Amazing – ten minutes. But, being very smart,
Ellsberg went to the next steps. The battle plans called for them to
take off and rendezvous with other squadrons from other bases at a
forward point in the air, and await radio signals there which would
order them forward if there were to be a real honest to goodness
attack. If they were ordered back – or, if there were no
communication at all at that time – they were to return to base.
Ellsberg asked, “Is this ever practiced?”
Answer
– no. It was impractical. The bombs were not really well enough
secured to trust them if there were to be takeoffs time and time
again. It would be very expensive to constantly rendezvous. So it
was only the initial part that was practiced. What were the
implications of that? Ellsberg reasoned that part of practicing was
to get used to routine, so that mistakes would be minimized – see
Thinking Fast and Slow by Danny Kahneman.vi
So if there would ever be an event that led to the squadrons
actually taking off, it would be very unusual, everyone would be
extremely edgy, and many would reason that this time it was the real
thing.
So
what would happen if they took off and made their rendezvous as
ordered, and then, no signal came to them? First, how likely would
that be? Ellsberg asked the Korean base commander how often
communications were out. It turned out that communications were
regularly out part of
every single day!
Weather conditions, other problems, they said. If what had
triggered the alert in the first place was some kind of accidental
explosion somewhere, it would also be likely that this would
interrupt communications. So it would be quite possible that at the
rendezvous there would be no signal forthcoming; they would be on
their own, never having practiced this part before, and having to
remember under stressful conditions that they were supposed to return
to base. And believing that if they got no signal it could well be
that a capitation event had occurred in Washington and/or Hawaii.
Ellsberg's
account of this possibility, of airplanes circling at the rendezvous
and getting no communication, in interviewing the forward base
commander in Korea, pp. 55-56:
I
asked, “How do you think that would work?”
The
major said “If they didn't get any Execute message? Oh, I think
they'd come back.” Pause. “Most of them.”
The
last three words didn't register with me right away because before
they were out of his mouth my head was exploding. I kept my face
blank but a voice within me was screaming, “Think? You think
they'd come back?”
This
was their commander, I thought, the one who gave them their orders,
the man in charge of their training and discipline. As I reeled
internally from that response, the next words, “most of them,”
got through to me.
He
added, “Of course, if one of them were to break out of that circle,
I think the rest would follow. He paused again, and then he added
reflexively, “And they might as well. If one goes, they might as
well all go. I tell them not to do it, though.”
Then
there was the question of the nuclear football that is carried by an
aide to the President. We all think, we are told repeatedly, that
the President has the power, and only he has the power, to order a
nuclear strike. But was that, and is that today, really true? It's
not really logical, after all. What if there is a decapitation
strike? Would all of the US retaliatory forces not be launched then,
because the President and his entourage had been destroyed? It is
much more logical to think that others had the command ability as
well. In his Jack Ryan role, Ellsberg asked Admiral Felt about it
and was put off. There were rumors all over CINCPAC that there was a
letter sent from the President authorizing CINCPAC Commander to order
a nuclear strike on his own. There were rumors that others had that
command possibility as well. Ellsberg couldn't find evidence of the
letter, until years later. But then he found that yes, there was a
letter. The idea we have of unitary command over nuclear strikes is
false.
Then
there is the issue of different points of view. This gets down to
bureaucratic politics of a sort. The chief concern of the civilian
sector of the nuclear project was that there be no accidents and no
mistaken attacks because of mistakes in thinking that we were being
attacked. That was the civilian focus. The military focus, however,
had a different priority. The military's priority was that if there
were an attack, that a nuclear counterattack was assured. To them,
the possibility of an accidental attack from our side was less
worrisome. So, anyone who has worked in a bureaucracy knows where
this leads. The civilians wanted to make sure that bombs were only
dropped with full authorization. So each plane had a specific code
that it would need to match with the order coming in – as we are
used to getting into our accounts on the internet, as we need the
code texted to our phones. But the military's priorities being what
they were, they knew that codes get lost, you can't find your code
sheet, etc. So they made every single code the same, 0001, or
something like that. You don't need to be an organizational
theorist, you just need to have worked in a bureaucracy to know that
this would happen, as it did. It took a close looker like Ellsberg
to discover this. In short, our control over bureaucracies is
limited.
These
competing priorities would also be reflected in the organization of
the war plans. Ellsberg discovered that the specific war plans were
a closely guarded military secret, and not only from the enemy. The
civilian masters of DOD, and the President himself, were not privy to
these plans! In the estimation of the military, there was no need
for them to know! As in, “The Navy will run the blockade, Mr.
President.” In fact, the plans were so closely guarded that it was
forbidden for anyone to mention the name of the plans!! That way,
there would be no troublesome requests to see the plans.
The
war plan as developed by the military – think Curtis LeMay, if you
want to think of the mindset of where this came from – could not be
too intricate. Large organizations are ponderous by their nature;
they cannot be otherwise. So many logistics, so many details, so
many people. So, when it came to war plans, Ellsberg discovered that
there was only one. If we were attacked, we would retaliate by
taking out the Soviet Union and China. What if China were not
involved in the attack? Well, too bad, said the military, we can't
do more than one plan, and 300 million Chinese would just have to pay
the price. What would set the war plan in motion? Conflict between
the US and USSR. What would constitute “conflict?” Undefined.
Forces fighting somewhere in the world? Maybe. Depends who was
judging, maybe.
This
is just the way organizations and people work. A few weeks ago
Hawaii experienced the incoming missile alert fiasco, a half-century
after the time Ellsberg describes. What led to it? A worker who had
had difficulty previously differentiating practice from the real
thing, and had been counseled (or not) and had been kept on. When
the call came in from the U.S. Pacific Command secure line to the
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, the worker who received the call
didn't put the initial part on speaker phone, the part that said
“exercise, exercise, exercise.” He did put it on for the part
that said, mistakenly, “This is not a drill.” The AP relates:
“the agency had a vague checklist for missile alerts, allowing
workers to interpret the steps they should follow differently.
Managers didn't require a second person to sign off on alerts before
they were sent, and the agency lacked any preparation on how to
correct a false warning.” And the Governor forgot his Twitter
password. There is no excuse for our believing that people and large
organizations will be any different in the future, be it making
infant formula in France ( rolling recall with infants dying,
corporation delaying and denying) or trying to control
life-destroying armaments.
I
was born three weeks before Pearl Harbor; I'm exactly ten years
younger than Ellsberg. His father, a superb structural engineer, was
a complete patriot. He was in charge of building the Ford Willow Run
plant and the Dodge Chicago plant that produced B-24's and B-29's
which was what I pretended to be as a four or five year old jumping
off our porch on Osage Avenue in Philadelphia, arms extended
laterally, as the war came to an end. Ellsberg's family history led
to his becoming a Marine and taking his plunge into defense policy at
the highest level. My own family history led me to medicine. While
he was pursuing defense policy I was wondering why I kept studying
when Kennedy has just been on TV about Cuba, and when our pompous
professor of physical chemistry who had been and Eisenhower adviser,
George Kistiakowsky, declared that Kennedy had made a basic error in
leaving Khrushchev no way to save face. I looked askance at the Ban
The Bomb marchers, maybe because they were so “sensible,” with no
real plans on countering evil aggression. Were they willing to have
standing armies, etc.? There is evil out there, do you remember
Hitler? I took more seriously the clock on the cover of the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, but did what most people did, marched
against the Vietnam War, chanted “Fuck you, Agnew,” but otherwise
stuck to my knitting. That is, I chose denial.
Now
we are faced with more and more nuclear problems, not fewer. What
started as Eisenhower's less expensive alternative to keeping vast
armies in place in Europe to guard against the Soviets –
Brinksmanship enabled our 50's economic expansion – and then
morphed into American domination by ultimate nuclear threat and our
military all over the world “training” – now looks worse than
ever. We can imagine an ignoramus such as we see in the White House
now saying, “Why do we have these weapons if we can't use them?”
We can see him saying, “Why don't we at least use the little ones?”
Indeed, the Pentagon is currently reconsidering the use of tactical
nuclear weapons.vii
LeMay
had wanted to use them earlier – wipe out the Commies, he said. He
and others were real militarists. Wiping out huge swaths of people
was fine with him. WWII was a great opportunity to experiment –
would wiping out a city with firebombs demoralize a country and take
them out of the fight or make them more steadfast? Hey – a chance
to experiment! Luckily for them, the Japanese militarists kept the
war going long enough for them to see what Little Boy and Fat Boy
would do. Seriously. I read elsewhere that LeMay told McNamara at
one point, “If we lose this war, we'll be hung as war criminals.”
And McNamara nodded assent. How different are the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards? I'm on our side and I'm against those terrible
Iranian militarists, but among people who think that way, there is a
lot of commonality. In Japan, after all, it was Tojo and the
militarists who were in charge. They had to be told by the Emperor
to stop fighting; many of them wanted to go on. There are
militarists everywhere, and it's not hard to see the connection
between arguments for gun control and arguments for nuke control.
To
our eyes, the militarists are clearly nuts. As Ellsberg says, during
the Berlin Crisis, when nukes were contemplated against the Soviets,
he wondered, after all is said and done and we use nukes on each
other and we look back, will we think, was Berlin worth it? As
Ellsberg says, what was once an issue of the destruction of
civilization as we know it, since the discovery in the 1980's of
Nuclear Winter, the stakes have been raised even higher. We are
talking about an extinction that would dwarf the other five in our
past. We are facing the possibility of extinguishing most of all the
life forms we know. We are talking about starting from scratch.
What
we know about human nature is frightening. What we know about
organizations and how they work and don't work, is frightening. What
we know about modern history is frightening. And we haven't even
mentioned WWI and wiping out a generation, of the disillusionment
with the wonders of technology born of machine guns and attacks over
the top.viii
Putin
interfering with our elections? China constructing bases in the
South China Sea? North Korea threatening what, a defense of its
awful government? Let's remember Ellsberg's question, would Berlin
have been worth it?
The
wise men cold warriors, McNamara, Schultz, Kissinger, Nunn, – all
those who were the most aggressive – what they say is, we have to
get rid of these weapons. Look at what can happen. These
organizations that have control of nuclear weapons are only poorly
controllable.
The
intimate history of the top leaders of the United States as told by
Ellsberg is that they would never have used the nukes. Kennedy
wouldn't have, McNamara wouldn't have, others wouldn't have.
Eisenhower wouldn't have, no matter what. To them, it was the
biggest bluff in the world. The survival of the world is a large
task to leave to a small and ever-changing leadership group. Like,
for instance, now.
Finally,
here is what is the most amazing thing to think: Dr Strangelove, Or
How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love The Bomb, was not a work of
fiction. It was fictionalized and exaggerated, but the essence was
amazingly true. From “Bodily Essence” Buck Turgidson, to Dr.
Strangelove and his dream of bunker survivors with the most beautiful
women, to forward commander Major “King” Kong, to a system with
no recall the bombers capacity, to the Doomsday Machine itself – in
it's essence, it is all essentially true!! It is. Stanley Kubrick
and Terry Southern got some of their information from Herman Kahn,
with whom Ellsberg worked as a junior colleague, but they must have
had lots of other inputs, because what they wrote was essentially
true, (Tom Lehrer's song was also true, I guess), just made funny
with the gallows humor that we were familiar with as medical students
when we saw our patients sicken and die.
Denial
is a pleasant state. We live in denial most of the time. I deny
that I will die, despite the fact that most of my tomorrows are in
the past. We leave to others the custodianship of the world, despite
the fact that we know that they and the organizations that they sit
at the head of, are not sufficiently responsible to trust them with
the future of the world.
There's
a lot more in Ellsberg's book. It will make you think and tremble.
It will make you long to Ban the Bomb. Hey, a universal service
obligation isn't a bad idea, anyway.
Budd
Shenkin
3/3/2018 -- After posting this piece, I became aware of a New Yorker article by Eric Schlosser that makes many of the same points I make, including the essential truth behind Dr. Strangelove. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/almost-everything-in-dr-strangelove-was-true
3/3/2018 -- After posting this piece, I became aware of a New Yorker article by Eric Schlosser that makes many of the same points I make, including the essential truth behind Dr. Strangelove. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/almost-everything-in-dr-strangelove-was-true
ihttps://www.amazon.com/Doomsday-Machine-Confessions-Nuclear-Planner/dp/1608196704/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1517602954&sr=1-1&keywords=ellsberg
iihttps://www.amazon.com/Confessions-Economic-Hit-John-Perkins/dp/0452287081/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1517581067&sr=8-2&keywords=confessions+of+an+economic+hit+man+perkins
iiihttps://www.amazon.com/Health-Care-Migrant-Workers-Policies/dp/0884101088/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1517581771&sr=1-1&keywords=shenkin+health+care+for+migrant+workers
ivhttps://www.amazon.com/Essence-Decision-Explaining-Missile-Crisis/dp/0321013492/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1517747970&sr=8-1&keywords=allison+essence+of+decision
v
https://www.amazon.com/Inside-Bureaucracy-Anthony-Downs/dp/0881337781/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1517057830&sr=8-1&keywords=inside+bureaucracy
vihttps://www.amazon.com/Thinking-Fast-Slow-Daniel-Kahneman/dp/0374533555/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1517748855&sr=1-1&keywords=kahneman+thinking+fast+and+slow
vii
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/trumps-new-nuke-nuclear-plan-npr-raising-alarms-among-military-brass-war/
viii
https://www.amazon.com/Fracture-Life-Culture-West-1918-1938/dp/0465022499/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1518302321&sr=8-1&keywords=fracture+philipp+blom
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