This is pretty true:
In three words – ‘insurance company rules’
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVpX5fUvPlg
Budd Shenkin
Saturday, August 1, 2009
Budd's Excellent Adventure
So. a week ago my wife and I were about an hour and a half out of Honolulu coming back to Oakland on Hawaiian Air, and I had my earphones on. Ann nudged me and said, "They're looking for a doctor." Now, my Dad was a great and idealistic doctor, but he certainly had a jaundiced side. He taught me, when they come looking for a doctor, don't volunteer - you'll just get yourself in trouble! Knowing my Dad, this was the voice of experience, either personal or vicarious. But Ann doesn't come from a medical family, so she has always wondered about my attitude as a Samaritan. I take my father's advice seriously.
But on the other hand, I've always said, try this thought experiment. You are walking along and you see someone with an affliction by the roadside. The year is 1875 (the time of Dickens, say.) You can't do anything for the poor soul. Then, time travel forward to the present. You are a doctor, you have modern medicines, and you can go over and give him some medicine and cure him. What a mitzvah ("gift" - that's a Latin word.) Who wouldn't do it? Isn't it great to be a doctor!
So, you can understand how when she told me they were looking for a doctor, Ann looked at me with some expectation, but also with a question of what I would do. Since I hadn't personally heard the call or seen the flight attendants (where are those cute stewardesses of yesteryear??), I said, see if they call again, and back on went the headphones.
But the next thing I knew, I saw this young man I soon learned was 28 years old, a Pacific Islander of some sort, about 300 pounds as Pacific Islanders can be, lying supine at the bulkhead seat just in front of me and to the right, and an older lady (probably not as old as me, but time being what it is, still an "older lady") tentatively administering to him. So I went over and identified myself as a doctor.
"What are you?" she said.
"A pediatrician," I said. "What are you?"
"An internist," she said. "But I do hospice work for Kaiser, and I mainly tend to the website."
OK, it might have been her age group specialty, but I know acute medicine and I'm a guy, and as Ann says, there was no way I wasn't going to be in charge.
So the history was that Tony, the patient, thought he had an allergy to peanuts and had just eaten some cashews the plane had passed out. Guess it's not a peanut allergy (they don't cross react.) Way to go, Tony!
The internist had the airplane's blood pressure cuff and stethoscope, and she said his pulse was 160 and his blood pressure about 80/60. Classic anaphylactic shock, no doubt from the nuts.
It was a good thing the plane had an emergency tackle box that had epinephrine in it, because after all this is just the kind of emergency that happens, and can be treated readily and easily, a wonderful advance since 1875. Since the internist seemed a bit befuddled and hadn't even asked for the epi yet, I took the epi, tried to figure out how to use it - had to attach a needle, it looked like, but probably didn't have to, I just didn't know how to use it. The internist looked around for a nurse - doctors use nurses so much they don't know how to do so much any more - even the new pediatricians who come to our practice don't know how to give an immunization themselves, amazingly enough, let alone how to incise and drain a wound. Anyway, I gave the epi, then gave 50 mg. of Benedryl intramuscularly. All the while I was being a good doctor, reassuring Tony - who by this time was complaining it was hard to breathe, the cardinal sign of how these patients die, by airway obstruction. I hoped I didn't have to do anything heroic, like cutting into his trachea, lots of luck. Tony kept saying thank you, and breathed with some difficulty.
But his pulse came down and his BP went up in about 5 minutes and I thought he was turning around. Then a young, very young woman came up from the back and identified herself as a family doc from Maui. Where the hell had she been? This is really her specialty! She listened to him and thought he was wheezing. So did the internist. Well, he wasn't. He had upper airway sounds; I know wheezing when I hear it. He was so heavy and the plane was noisy so it was hard to hear anything, but they were worried about his wheezing. The FP wanted to give him something for wheezing so she shot in some terbutaline. Made him very tremulous. Then the fp went back to her seat, her magic done.
The internist said we should ask them to turn the plane around. I said I thought he was stabilizing and would be OK. I said if we turned around he would walk off the plane looking just fine and everyone would wonder what the fuss was about. He didn't complain about its being hard to breathe so much. I looked over at Ann and made a circular sign with my upraised finger and mouthed, "Turn around?" She shook her head decisively and mouthed back, "Unh-uh!" But she knew if we had to we would.
I talked to the captain on the phone and told him the difference of opinion, and I said I think he's stabilized so let's see. The captain talked to their contracted emergency service physicians on the radio and I guess they said stick with it because I didn't hear anything more. Tony's BP was up over 100 and his pulse down to 110. He was shivering a lot but that could be due to the terbutaline. I was on one knee beside him for about 45 minutes reassuring and monitoring. His BP came up to 120/80, then 140/100. Then his wife of one year, probably also about 225 pounds, asked if he could sit up. I said absolutely. He sat up, I took the oxygen away from him, and he slept sitting in a seat the rest of the way. Even with his weight, the Benedryl probably made him sleepy. We didn't turn around. There was an emergency crew waiting for him in Oakland and I quickly gave the history, and that's all she wrote.
So, I kept everyone cool and enjoyed being a real doctor, and Ann was very proud of me, and how I kep everyone calm.. I wondered what Hawaiian Air would do for me. It was interesting. When he went to the bathroom, the captain looked back and saw me and gave me a wink and a nod. The purser gave me a form to fill out and sign that I had attended to the patient. Aloha.
I suppose they figure, this is just what doctors do; there is a public trust. I didn't know whether to feel respected, or to feel like a sucker. Tony's wife did get my name - I gave her my card. She was very thankful and wanted to recognize me some way it seemed. Haven't heard from them.
I'm grateful that I didn't get into any trouble, that this particular good deed seems to have gone unpunished. O tempora, o mores.
Budd Shenkin
Ann and I were on the plane back home about 1.5 hours out from Honolulu when the attendants went looking for a doctor. Before I knew it a 300 lb. 28 yo Pacific Islander (I think) named Tony was lying on the floor of the plane in front of me with a pulse of 160, BP 80/60, complaining of difficulty breathing around the throat. Nuts had just been served. So there was this doc from Kaiser who did hospice work and drives their website, a very young FP who practices on Maui, a retired nurse, and me. So, we opened the crash box of the plane, I gave him epi and Benedryl, and the FP give terbuterol because she thought he had some wheezes. (I thought it was all upper airway - the guy was pretty heavy.) I talked to the captain, told him I thought Tony was stabilizing, we didn't turn the plane around, and the emergency crew waited for Tony at the Oakland airport, but he seemed pretty good by that time. You just never know what will happen.
But on the other hand, I've always said, try this thought experiment. You are walking along and you see someone with an affliction by the roadside. The year is 1875 (the time of Dickens, say.) You can't do anything for the poor soul. Then, time travel forward to the present. You are a doctor, you have modern medicines, and you can go over and give him some medicine and cure him. What a mitzvah ("gift" - that's a Latin word.) Who wouldn't do it? Isn't it great to be a doctor!
So, you can understand how when she told me they were looking for a doctor, Ann looked at me with some expectation, but also with a question of what I would do. Since I hadn't personally heard the call or seen the flight attendants (where are those cute stewardesses of yesteryear??), I said, see if they call again, and back on went the headphones.
But the next thing I knew, I saw this young man I soon learned was 28 years old, a Pacific Islander of some sort, about 300 pounds as Pacific Islanders can be, lying supine at the bulkhead seat just in front of me and to the right, and an older lady (probably not as old as me, but time being what it is, still an "older lady") tentatively administering to him. So I went over and identified myself as a doctor.
"What are you?" she said.
"A pediatrician," I said. "What are you?"
"An internist," she said. "But I do hospice work for Kaiser, and I mainly tend to the website."
OK, it might have been her age group specialty, but I know acute medicine and I'm a guy, and as Ann says, there was no way I wasn't going to be in charge.
So the history was that Tony, the patient, thought he had an allergy to peanuts and had just eaten some cashews the plane had passed out. Guess it's not a peanut allergy (they don't cross react.) Way to go, Tony!
The internist had the airplane's blood pressure cuff and stethoscope, and she said his pulse was 160 and his blood pressure about 80/60. Classic anaphylactic shock, no doubt from the nuts.
It was a good thing the plane had an emergency tackle box that had epinephrine in it, because after all this is just the kind of emergency that happens, and can be treated readily and easily, a wonderful advance since 1875. Since the internist seemed a bit befuddled and hadn't even asked for the epi yet, I took the epi, tried to figure out how to use it - had to attach a needle, it looked like, but probably didn't have to, I just didn't know how to use it. The internist looked around for a nurse - doctors use nurses so much they don't know how to do so much any more - even the new pediatricians who come to our practice don't know how to give an immunization themselves, amazingly enough, let alone how to incise and drain a wound. Anyway, I gave the epi, then gave 50 mg. of Benedryl intramuscularly. All the while I was being a good doctor, reassuring Tony - who by this time was complaining it was hard to breathe, the cardinal sign of how these patients die, by airway obstruction. I hoped I didn't have to do anything heroic, like cutting into his trachea, lots of luck. Tony kept saying thank you, and breathed with some difficulty.
But his pulse came down and his BP went up in about 5 minutes and I thought he was turning around. Then a young, very young woman came up from the back and identified herself as a family doc from Maui. Where the hell had she been? This is really her specialty! She listened to him and thought he was wheezing. So did the internist. Well, he wasn't. He had upper airway sounds; I know wheezing when I hear it. He was so heavy and the plane was noisy so it was hard to hear anything, but they were worried about his wheezing. The FP wanted to give him something for wheezing so she shot in some terbutaline. Made him very tremulous. Then the fp went back to her seat, her magic done.
The internist said we should ask them to turn the plane around. I said I thought he was stabilizing and would be OK. I said if we turned around he would walk off the plane looking just fine and everyone would wonder what the fuss was about. He didn't complain about its being hard to breathe so much. I looked over at Ann and made a circular sign with my upraised finger and mouthed, "Turn around?" She shook her head decisively and mouthed back, "Unh-uh!" But she knew if we had to we would.
I talked to the captain on the phone and told him the difference of opinion, and I said I think he's stabilized so let's see. The captain talked to their contracted emergency service physicians on the radio and I guess they said stick with it because I didn't hear anything more. Tony's BP was up over 100 and his pulse down to 110. He was shivering a lot but that could be due to the terbutaline. I was on one knee beside him for about 45 minutes reassuring and monitoring. His BP came up to 120/80, then 140/100. Then his wife of one year, probably also about 225 pounds, asked if he could sit up. I said absolutely. He sat up, I took the oxygen away from him, and he slept sitting in a seat the rest of the way. Even with his weight, the Benedryl probably made him sleepy. We didn't turn around. There was an emergency crew waiting for him in Oakland and I quickly gave the history, and that's all she wrote.
So, I kept everyone cool and enjoyed being a real doctor, and Ann was very proud of me, and how I kep everyone calm.. I wondered what Hawaiian Air would do for me. It was interesting. When he went to the bathroom, the captain looked back and saw me and gave me a wink and a nod. The purser gave me a form to fill out and sign that I had attended to the patient. Aloha.
I suppose they figure, this is just what doctors do; there is a public trust. I didn't know whether to feel respected, or to feel like a sucker. Tony's wife did get my name - I gave her my card. She was very thankful and wanted to recognize me some way it seemed. Haven't heard from them.
I'm grateful that I didn't get into any trouble, that this particular good deed seems to have gone unpunished. O tempora, o mores.
Budd Shenkin
Ann and I were on the plane back home about 1.5 hours out from Honolulu when the attendants went looking for a doctor. Before I knew it a 300 lb. 28 yo Pacific Islander (I think) named Tony was lying on the floor of the plane in front of me with a pulse of 160, BP 80/60, complaining of difficulty breathing around the throat. Nuts had just been served. So there was this doc from Kaiser who did hospice work and drives their website, a very young FP who practices on Maui, a retired nurse, and me. So, we opened the crash box of the plane, I gave him epi and Benedryl, and the FP give terbuterol because she thought he had some wheezes. (I thought it was all upper airway - the guy was pretty heavy.) I talked to the captain, told him I thought Tony was stabilizing, we didn't turn the plane around, and the emergency crew waited for Tony at the Oakland airport, but he seemed pretty good by that time. You just never know what will happen.
Monday, July 27, 2009
Are people really satisfied with the health insurance they have?
‘How’s your wife?”
“Compared to what?”
H. Youngman
We keep hearing that people are “satisfied” with the health insurance they have. I have to ask, compared to what?
We live our lives comparatively. When we judge our wealth and income, our success in life, even our health by comparing it to others. Just look at your true feelings as you attend school reunions. There is fellowship, pleasure, … and comparisons.
Why would anyone be “satisfied” with their current health insurance? It is very expensive, unduly restrictive, uninformative and mysterious
I can only think, compared to not having insurance. OK, that makes sense. Or, compared to being on Medicaid, or having to go to a clinic. Or, compared to having to pay for the whole thing yourself and not be helped by an employer. Or, finally, compared to what might be coming down the pike and you might have to change to something new that you haven’t tried before, because we fear change. We do think comparatively.
Years ago we had a young new employee from a labor union family when single payer came up on the California ballot. Of course, this would have benefited her a great deal. But she was against it. We asked her why. She said that it would probably all be just like Medicaid, and she wanted "private insurance." Was that comparative thinking? I thought maybe it was.
I have to agree that I think similarly.
But if we compare our insurance to the way it used to be, don't we get another picture? Price has risen astronomically. Is it not significant that health insurance costs twice what it did ten years ago, on average? In many cases (Bayside Medical Group, our practice, for instance), only double would be a blessing. Difficulties with accessing care has risen. Providers drop out of networks and leave patients with more to pay, or needing to change providers. Provisions within policies have become more company-friendly rather than patient friendly. The insured have become progressively under-insured. We are the proverbial frogs in the slowly warming water that will parboil us if we don't do something, but we don't know quite what to do.
We can also compare our insurance to that of other countries, but that gets shot down too quick - Canada, the UK, they certainly have their problems. Sweden has too different a culture. France is too French. It is tough for people to imagine difference.
But in sum, I think all this public obeisance to “you can keep the insurance you currently have” is just for political sales; necessary, but destined to be transitory. The point is, break the logjam, get reform started, get some people on new insurance, and most will say, “remember that old insurance that we liked? It stank!”
Budd Shenkin
“Compared to what?”
H. Youngman
We keep hearing that people are “satisfied” with the health insurance they have. I have to ask, compared to what?
We live our lives comparatively. When we judge our wealth and income, our success in life, even our health by comparing it to others. Just look at your true feelings as you attend school reunions. There is fellowship, pleasure, … and comparisons.
Why would anyone be “satisfied” with their current health insurance? It is very expensive, unduly restrictive, uninformative and mysterious
I can only think, compared to not having insurance. OK, that makes sense. Or, compared to being on Medicaid, or having to go to a clinic. Or, compared to having to pay for the whole thing yourself and not be helped by an employer. Or, finally, compared to what might be coming down the pike and you might have to change to something new that you haven’t tried before, because we fear change. We do think comparatively.
Years ago we had a young new employee from a labor union family when single payer came up on the California ballot. Of course, this would have benefited her a great deal. But she was against it. We asked her why. She said that it would probably all be just like Medicaid, and she wanted "private insurance." Was that comparative thinking? I thought maybe it was.
I have to agree that I think similarly.
But if we compare our insurance to the way it used to be, don't we get another picture? Price has risen astronomically. Is it not significant that health insurance costs twice what it did ten years ago, on average? In many cases (Bayside Medical Group, our practice, for instance), only double would be a blessing. Difficulties with accessing care has risen. Providers drop out of networks and leave patients with more to pay, or needing to change providers. Provisions within policies have become more company-friendly rather than patient friendly. The insured have become progressively under-insured. We are the proverbial frogs in the slowly warming water that will parboil us if we don't do something, but we don't know quite what to do.
We can also compare our insurance to that of other countries, but that gets shot down too quick - Canada, the UK, they certainly have their problems. Sweden has too different a culture. France is too French. It is tough for people to imagine difference.
But in sum, I think all this public obeisance to “you can keep the insurance you currently have” is just for political sales; necessary, but destined to be transitory. The point is, break the logjam, get reform started, get some people on new insurance, and most will say, “remember that old insurance that we liked? It stank!”
Budd Shenkin
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Is Health Care Reform Really Costly?
Here is something I don’t understand. The biggest current issue in the health care reform debate is, how much will it cost, and how can we cover that cost? What I don’t think I understand is this: are we just looking at the cost to the Federal government? If so, that’s a pretty narrow view, I think.
Look at it this way. Currently, about 47 million people are uninsured. When they get sick and are hospitalized, they get astronomical bills, as we all do. Since they are uninsured, they might pay some of it or all of the bill, but frequently pay none of it and/or declare bankruptcy. The hospitals thus don’t receive recompense for their services. The hospitals say that they spread this cost to all those who are insured by keeping their rates high, and collecting enough from insured patients to cover their expenditures for the uncovered.
Now, say that health reform leads to most of the currently uninsured become insured. Insurance money now flows from the Feds and people now required to purchase insurance, to the insurance companies and into the hospitals (and other providers) where it didn’t flow before. That’s more income for the providers. There is no change in utilization from before; the only change is where the money comes from and how it is distributed. The government helped to supply the money for the insurance, but now the hospitals get money they didn’t get before. If the hospitals keep their prices high, they benefit from the transfer from the government. If they lower their prices because they now would have no need to spread their loss, then insurance prices could decline, incomes would increase because of lower health insurance costs, and higher taxes would flow to the Federal government. The problem would be disgorgement of new-found profits from hospitals, not an easy problem to fix, but fixable.
In addition, if it is true that the uninsured now utilize emergency rooms disproportionately, and if they were insured they would switch to doctors’ offices which would be less expensive, we would be looking at a true decrease in utilization and a true decrease in cost.
The point is, it would seem to me quite possible that the true cost to society would be stable or decline if we were to follow the broad outlines of current insurance reform proposals. The problem with costliness would be in the Federal government budget, but the nation’s wealth would either be unaffected or perhaps increase. Looked at this way, it is simply a problem of reclaiming the Federal government’s investment, rather than actually looking at an increase n national expenditure.
Or am I wrong?
Budd Shenkin
Look at it this way. Currently, about 47 million people are uninsured. When they get sick and are hospitalized, they get astronomical bills, as we all do. Since they are uninsured, they might pay some of it or all of the bill, but frequently pay none of it and/or declare bankruptcy. The hospitals thus don’t receive recompense for their services. The hospitals say that they spread this cost to all those who are insured by keeping their rates high, and collecting enough from insured patients to cover their expenditures for the uncovered.
Now, say that health reform leads to most of the currently uninsured become insured. Insurance money now flows from the Feds and people now required to purchase insurance, to the insurance companies and into the hospitals (and other providers) where it didn’t flow before. That’s more income for the providers. There is no change in utilization from before; the only change is where the money comes from and how it is distributed. The government helped to supply the money for the insurance, but now the hospitals get money they didn’t get before. If the hospitals keep their prices high, they benefit from the transfer from the government. If they lower their prices because they now would have no need to spread their loss, then insurance prices could decline, incomes would increase because of lower health insurance costs, and higher taxes would flow to the Federal government. The problem would be disgorgement of new-found profits from hospitals, not an easy problem to fix, but fixable.
In addition, if it is true that the uninsured now utilize emergency rooms disproportionately, and if they were insured they would switch to doctors’ offices which would be less expensive, we would be looking at a true decrease in utilization and a true decrease in cost.
The point is, it would seem to me quite possible that the true cost to society would be stable or decline if we were to follow the broad outlines of current insurance reform proposals. The problem with costliness would be in the Federal government budget, but the nation’s wealth would either be unaffected or perhaps increase. Looked at this way, it is simply a problem of reclaiming the Federal government’s investment, rather than actually looking at an increase n national expenditure.
Or am I wrong?
Budd Shenkin
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
How much out of pocket should a patient pay?
I'm concerned about the amount of out of pocket costs patients might be required to pay under the new plan to come. Currently the basic plan on the HIE under HR3200 calls for $5,000 out of pocket for a person, and $10,000 for a family. This seems so high to me!
Here is what the Commonwealth Fund says about subscribers currently:
"People enrolled in an individual market plan spend far more out-of-pocket and on premiums than those with employer-based coverage: the average family covered by an employer plan spends $2,250 out-of-pocket on health expenses, while those with individual insurance spend an average of $6,750. Adults with individual market coverage are also more likely to have high deductibles and face limits on what their plans will pay. More than two of five adults with coverage through the individual market report not getting needed health care because of the cost."
But, one of the main objectives of the HIE is to make insurance available to individuals on the same basis as those with group insurance. So, has that been achieved by HR 3200? Not in this respect, it would seem. Where did they get this, I have to wonder? If you need to save money, this doesn't seem to me to be the place to save it. It's like being defeated by your own hand.
Budd Shenkin
Here is what the Commonwealth Fund says about subscribers currently:
"People enrolled in an individual market plan spend far more out-of-pocket and on premiums than those with employer-based coverage: the average family covered by an employer plan spends $2,250 out-of-pocket on health expenses, while those with individual insurance spend an average of $6,750. Adults with individual market coverage are also more likely to have high deductibles and face limits on what their plans will pay. More than two of five adults with coverage through the individual market report not getting needed health care because of the cost."
But, one of the main objectives of the HIE is to make insurance available to individuals on the same basis as those with group insurance. So, has that been achieved by HR 3200? Not in this respect, it would seem. Where did they get this, I have to wonder? If you need to save money, this doesn't seem to me to be the place to save it. It's like being defeated by your own hand.
Budd Shenkin
Health Reform - Public Option, Private Option
I think I now understand how the new health plan could work. I have dealt with the heart of the plan, the Health Insurance Exchange (HIE), previously. It's a good heart of a plan. But the role of the Public Option has been obscure. Here's what I think.
The Great Health Reform Bill (GHRB) of 2009 needs to set the path for reform of the health care system. It can’t solve a whole lot of things at once, but it can solve some of them – access to health insurance being the most prominent. But making the health system more effective, efficient, and cost-saving will take time. The role of the GHRB should be to get us on the path.
We are set to have a Health Insurance Exchange. That’s very good. The HIE will make health insurance accessible to people, will set standards that people can understand and be sure of, and stop insurance companies from making money by shucking and jiving – not covering things, denying insurance after the fact (rescissions), low-balling vulnerable primary care providers, etc. As currently constructed the basic insurance policy under the plan is pretty bad – high deductible insurance was a bad idea from the start. But we won’t deal with that in this post – I think I’ve dealt with it before. This can be solved. The current bills also restrict access to the HIE to individuals and very small groups, which is also bad. Why not make it accessible to larger groups? The answer seems to be that the authors of the GHRB are afraid of adverse selection – that is, the only reason a larger group would opt for the HIE would be that they couldn’t get a good policy from a conventional private plan, because of poor health care utilization history. This reasoning means, we’ll give private people a good deal, but screw the larger groups that can’t get coverage. Thanks a lot. But again, that can be solved.
But those problems aside – I couldn’t help but comment – the biggest problem lawmakers and lobbyists are dealing with is the Public Option. Clearly, if there were a Medicare-like plan that competed with the full force of the public coffers behind it, this sort of PO would be able to blow the private plans out of the water. The so-called “volume discounts” available to a Medicare-like PO would mean that they could pay providers much less, charge the public less for policies, and drive the private plans out of business. A temporary fix for costs, yes, but in effect creating a single-payer plan. The country currently rejects this option, as do I unless it were completely thought through, which it hasn’t been. So it’s a non-starter. The next option for a PO is a good possibility – a government sponsored plan on a level playing field. This would mean that the PO would obey all the rules that apply to the private plans – be funded only with premiums, keep similar reserves, etc. Although denied “volume discounts,” this type of PO would still be able to “keep the private plans honest.”
OK – how would that solve anything? To answer that question, we need to look at the as to now unexamined side of the equation – that of providers. (For those who have been skimming, here is the meat of this post!)
Currently, the private health insurance companies not only contract with customers who buy their policies, but they contract with providers as well. The contractors can be individual physicians, integrated groups of physicians, individual hospitals, larger hospitals and hospital chains, pharmaceutical companies, and others. Depending on market power, the insurance companies are winners or losers on each contract, although with their overall book of business they need to be solvent. But the insurance company has freedom to contract or not contract with each entity. They make business decisions.
Medicare, however, does not have such latitude. Medicare has a set price and a method of paying, take it or leave it. If the provider meets the Medicare standard of professional requirements, they have to be accepted as Medicare providers. This is called Any Willing Provider (AWP).
I would propose the same AWP rule for the PO – any willing provider would be admitted as a contactor to the program. The terms of engagement would not be differentiated by the judgement of the governmental agency – that would constitute a great difference between the PO and private options. But it would mean that no provider would be completely shut out of business.
I would further propose that the PO set their prices in accord with public policy objectives. For instance, the pay of various specialties under our current system is very skewed. There is a curve with primaries at the bottom, some specialties (general surgery, for instance) in the middle, and some specialties (orthopedics, interventional cardiology, radiology) at the top. As a direct result of this allocation, not surprisingly, the top paid specialties have many recruits and the lower paid specialties, especially primary care, are wanting. I would propose that the PO adjust the pay of these specialties to rectify the current imbalance. A possibility might be 125% of Medicare rates for primary care, 115% for the middle specialties, and 90% for the high-flyers. It may be that the PO would have difficulty recruiting the top-paid specialties for these contracts. This might mean that there would have to be high-level negotiations in Washington. There may be no other way.
Likewise with hospitals. Currently, the payment scheme has many hospitals making tons of money, because there is often no real competition for many of these capital intensive institutions. Their contracts with private insurance companies are very lucrative; many hospitals are making tens of millions of dollars profit per year. The PO would be charged, in concert with Medicare, to introducing the rigors of competition to the hospitals.
If this were done, let’s look at what would happen on the private side. The private plans would not have the requirement of AWP; they could accept or reject whomever they wanted. Seeking profits, it would be in the interest of the insurance companies to organize superior networks of providers. What would “superior networks” be? They would be providers who pleased the public and thus obtained subscribers, and saved money while doing it. These insurance/provider plans might cost more money for each subscriber – but if the improved service were worth it, that’s competition. Or, they might be less expensive, since the plan could reject less cost-effective providers. These plans might let go of fee-for-service and opt for capitation. They might be able to assemble actual “accountable organizations” that accepted capitated payments for defined episodes of care. They might be primary care groups that assembled themselves, and then referred their patients to preferred centers of excellence for specialty services, as suggested in “Redefining Health Care” by Porter and Teisberg.
In other words, the PO would be traditional and stable as an entity, not changing the method of payment of providers (although it might go back to DRG’s for hospitals). If the experimentation of the insurance companies/provider networks went awry, it would be a port in the storm for patients to switch to. At the same time, it would be able to enact some of the more obvious needs of public policy.
The private plans have not been good at positive innovation up until now. They have not been able to team with providers in the public interest. They have not been able to adjust the pay of primaries and specialists to conform to public needs. In fact, they have come up with plans – high deductibles – that have negatively impacted the problems. Now, under new conditions, they would need to innovate positively to survive and prosper. At the same time, they would be constrained by the PO to keep costs down to be able to compete, but on a level playing field.
Politically, this should be a saleable. The Left wants a PO – here it would have one. The Right wants a level playing field and competition – here it would have it. Primary care needs to have support – here it would have it. Costs need to be contained and the path set for further cost reductions by efficiency rather than rationing – this would happen. Monopolistic and oligopsonistic hospitals need to be constrained – this proposal would work toward that goal. High-flying specialties need to be restrained – this proposal would do that.
So, that’s my plan.
Budd Shenkin
The Great Health Reform Bill (GHRB) of 2009 needs to set the path for reform of the health care system. It can’t solve a whole lot of things at once, but it can solve some of them – access to health insurance being the most prominent. But making the health system more effective, efficient, and cost-saving will take time. The role of the GHRB should be to get us on the path.
We are set to have a Health Insurance Exchange. That’s very good. The HIE will make health insurance accessible to people, will set standards that people can understand and be sure of, and stop insurance companies from making money by shucking and jiving – not covering things, denying insurance after the fact (rescissions), low-balling vulnerable primary care providers, etc. As currently constructed the basic insurance policy under the plan is pretty bad – high deductible insurance was a bad idea from the start. But we won’t deal with that in this post – I think I’ve dealt with it before. This can be solved. The current bills also restrict access to the HIE to individuals and very small groups, which is also bad. Why not make it accessible to larger groups? The answer seems to be that the authors of the GHRB are afraid of adverse selection – that is, the only reason a larger group would opt for the HIE would be that they couldn’t get a good policy from a conventional private plan, because of poor health care utilization history. This reasoning means, we’ll give private people a good deal, but screw the larger groups that can’t get coverage. Thanks a lot. But again, that can be solved.
But those problems aside – I couldn’t help but comment – the biggest problem lawmakers and lobbyists are dealing with is the Public Option. Clearly, if there were a Medicare-like plan that competed with the full force of the public coffers behind it, this sort of PO would be able to blow the private plans out of the water. The so-called “volume discounts” available to a Medicare-like PO would mean that they could pay providers much less, charge the public less for policies, and drive the private plans out of business. A temporary fix for costs, yes, but in effect creating a single-payer plan. The country currently rejects this option, as do I unless it were completely thought through, which it hasn’t been. So it’s a non-starter. The next option for a PO is a good possibility – a government sponsored plan on a level playing field. This would mean that the PO would obey all the rules that apply to the private plans – be funded only with premiums, keep similar reserves, etc. Although denied “volume discounts,” this type of PO would still be able to “keep the private plans honest.”
OK – how would that solve anything? To answer that question, we need to look at the as to now unexamined side of the equation – that of providers. (For those who have been skimming, here is the meat of this post!)
Currently, the private health insurance companies not only contract with customers who buy their policies, but they contract with providers as well. The contractors can be individual physicians, integrated groups of physicians, individual hospitals, larger hospitals and hospital chains, pharmaceutical companies, and others. Depending on market power, the insurance companies are winners or losers on each contract, although with their overall book of business they need to be solvent. But the insurance company has freedom to contract or not contract with each entity. They make business decisions.
Medicare, however, does not have such latitude. Medicare has a set price and a method of paying, take it or leave it. If the provider meets the Medicare standard of professional requirements, they have to be accepted as Medicare providers. This is called Any Willing Provider (AWP).
I would propose the same AWP rule for the PO – any willing provider would be admitted as a contactor to the program. The terms of engagement would not be differentiated by the judgement of the governmental agency – that would constitute a great difference between the PO and private options. But it would mean that no provider would be completely shut out of business.
I would further propose that the PO set their prices in accord with public policy objectives. For instance, the pay of various specialties under our current system is very skewed. There is a curve with primaries at the bottom, some specialties (general surgery, for instance) in the middle, and some specialties (orthopedics, interventional cardiology, radiology) at the top. As a direct result of this allocation, not surprisingly, the top paid specialties have many recruits and the lower paid specialties, especially primary care, are wanting. I would propose that the PO adjust the pay of these specialties to rectify the current imbalance. A possibility might be 125% of Medicare rates for primary care, 115% for the middle specialties, and 90% for the high-flyers. It may be that the PO would have difficulty recruiting the top-paid specialties for these contracts. This might mean that there would have to be high-level negotiations in Washington. There may be no other way.
Likewise with hospitals. Currently, the payment scheme has many hospitals making tons of money, because there is often no real competition for many of these capital intensive institutions. Their contracts with private insurance companies are very lucrative; many hospitals are making tens of millions of dollars profit per year. The PO would be charged, in concert with Medicare, to introducing the rigors of competition to the hospitals.
If this were done, let’s look at what would happen on the private side. The private plans would not have the requirement of AWP; they could accept or reject whomever they wanted. Seeking profits, it would be in the interest of the insurance companies to organize superior networks of providers. What would “superior networks” be? They would be providers who pleased the public and thus obtained subscribers, and saved money while doing it. These insurance/provider plans might cost more money for each subscriber – but if the improved service were worth it, that’s competition. Or, they might be less expensive, since the plan could reject less cost-effective providers. These plans might let go of fee-for-service and opt for capitation. They might be able to assemble actual “accountable organizations” that accepted capitated payments for defined episodes of care. They might be primary care groups that assembled themselves, and then referred their patients to preferred centers of excellence for specialty services, as suggested in “Redefining Health Care” by Porter and Teisberg.
In other words, the PO would be traditional and stable as an entity, not changing the method of payment of providers (although it might go back to DRG’s for hospitals). If the experimentation of the insurance companies/provider networks went awry, it would be a port in the storm for patients to switch to. At the same time, it would be able to enact some of the more obvious needs of public policy.
The private plans have not been good at positive innovation up until now. They have not been able to team with providers in the public interest. They have not been able to adjust the pay of primaries and specialists to conform to public needs. In fact, they have come up with plans – high deductibles – that have negatively impacted the problems. Now, under new conditions, they would need to innovate positively to survive and prosper. At the same time, they would be constrained by the PO to keep costs down to be able to compete, but on a level playing field.
Politically, this should be a saleable. The Left wants a PO – here it would have one. The Right wants a level playing field and competition – here it would have it. Primary care needs to have support – here it would have it. Costs need to be contained and the path set for further cost reductions by efficiency rather than rationing – this would happen. Monopolistic and oligopsonistic hospitals need to be constrained – this proposal would work toward that goal. High-flying specialties need to be restrained – this proposal would do that.
So, that’s my plan.
Budd Shenkin
Friday, July 17, 2009
Economy Held Hostage
Goldman Sachs has just reported multi-billion dollar half-year profits, to be distributed as usual to the usual suspects. By this time everyone knows that Hank Paulson, recruited by dumb George Bush who was apparently all through dispensing as much as he could to his oil and war-profiteering buddies, got the taxpayers to pay AIG off so they could pay Goldman Sachs off, from whence came Paulson. Privatize profits, socialize losses - no change there.
So outrage is building, as it totally should, as well as realization of having been played for the patsy. If you don't know who the patsy is sitting around the table, it's you.
So, we read the papers and boil, and realize that Obama has the Wall Street stooges in place who are aiding and abetting. But I'm also reading The Ignorance of Blood, the third of the Seville Trilogy by Robert Wilson. It is another police procedural crime book, featuring the Russian mafia in Spain. So - this gives me insight to Goldman! Not that anyone else didn't see it.
We are in a hostage situation. "Too Big to Fail" is essentially a hostage setup. If we fail, they say, the economy goes with us. Go ahead, stick it to us - you will cause your own demise and everyone else's. Your only chance is to pay us to continue to exist and function, and it will be on our terms. What can one do? We ARE hostage. We WILL fail. Everything WOULD collapse. So we pay the money.
But, if you are in a hostage situation, you also realize that the getaway is pretty important. You can pay the money, you can get the hostage back - but the Mafia then has to get away with it. They can do that. They can have so infiltrated the police and the politicians that they will be protected. The few good souls can be emasculated if the whole society is rotten. Or, after the hostage is returned, there can be a bona fide effort to find the culprits, punish them, kill them if possible, and change the situation so that organized crime has no more standing, or at least much less.
So that will be the test for the Administration and the politicians. I'm not so sanguine about the future. Do they see the full extent of the problem? Are there too many stooges paid off within the body politic? Can they use anti-trust? Can they change the rules that should never have been changed in the first place?
They have to wait until recovery is in place. Then we'll see.
Budd Shenkin
So outrage is building, as it totally should, as well as realization of having been played for the patsy. If you don't know who the patsy is sitting around the table, it's you.
So, we read the papers and boil, and realize that Obama has the Wall Street stooges in place who are aiding and abetting. But I'm also reading The Ignorance of Blood, the third of the Seville Trilogy by Robert Wilson. It is another police procedural crime book, featuring the Russian mafia in Spain. So - this gives me insight to Goldman! Not that anyone else didn't see it.
We are in a hostage situation. "Too Big to Fail" is essentially a hostage setup. If we fail, they say, the economy goes with us. Go ahead, stick it to us - you will cause your own demise and everyone else's. Your only chance is to pay us to continue to exist and function, and it will be on our terms. What can one do? We ARE hostage. We WILL fail. Everything WOULD collapse. So we pay the money.
But, if you are in a hostage situation, you also realize that the getaway is pretty important. You can pay the money, you can get the hostage back - but the Mafia then has to get away with it. They can do that. They can have so infiltrated the police and the politicians that they will be protected. The few good souls can be emasculated if the whole society is rotten. Or, after the hostage is returned, there can be a bona fide effort to find the culprits, punish them, kill them if possible, and change the situation so that organized crime has no more standing, or at least much less.
So that will be the test for the Administration and the politicians. I'm not so sanguine about the future. Do they see the full extent of the problem? Are there too many stooges paid off within the body politic? Can they use anti-trust? Can they change the rules that should never have been changed in the first place?
They have to wait until recovery is in place. Then we'll see.
Budd Shenkin
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